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THE EXECUTIVE'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY: AN UNRESOLVED
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JRt
A CONSTITUTIONAL question of the first importance, raised in more or less
acute form in practically every administration from Washington's to Eisen-
hower's, is, singularly enough, still wide open. That question is the constitu-
tional power of the executive to withhold information from the legislature. It
seems to be no nearer settlement today than it was in 1792, when President
Washington announced the right of the executive to exercise its discretion in
communicating executive documents requested by a committee appointed by
the House of Representatives "to inquire into the causes of the failure of the
late expedition under Major General St. Clair."'
A regular readef of the newspapers need reflect but briefly to realize the
tremendous political importance of the problem. The files of the executive
bulge with documents which Congressmen, from the best and worst motives,
are eager to examine and which bureaucrats, also from the best and worst
motives, are determined to keep to themselves. Many of these documents, if
published, would certainly cause headlines and headaches all across the nation,
and some might create a stir in foreign chancelleries-a prospect from which
the average legislator, especially if he be up for re-election, shrinks about as
much as Brer Rabbit shrank from the briar patch, but which may cause ex-
quisite pain to the executive branch. An example: among the large number
of dossiers maintained by the FBI and the various intelligence and security
services in the Pentagon there are inevitably some whose subjects are persons
of local or national prominence. Many such dossiers contain "derogatory" in-
formation 2 which, if portentously attributed by an unfriendly politician to "the
tDeputy General Counsel of the Army, July, 1952 to October 1, 1953; Acting General
Counsel in August and September, 1953. Member of the District of Columbia and New
York Bars.
. See BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 40-41 (1947). On this occasion, the
President found no papers which might not properly be inspected by Congress. But four
years later the problem recurred when a committee of the House demanded copies of the
instructions and other documents employed in connection with the negotiation of a treaty
with Great Britain. This time Washington found that "a just regard to the Constitution
and to the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance
with your request." 1 RIcHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 188
(1897).
2. The inclusion in a file of such information does not, of course, mean that it is true,
or even that the agency thinks it is true. The investigators simply collect all available
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files of the FBI," might produce a political explosion. Another example: the
files of the State and Defense Departments are naturally full of records of con-
versations between the governments of the United States and other countries,
the disclosure of which might benefit the political fortunes of the Congressmen
who disclosed them in approximate proportion to its adverse effect on relations
between the two countries. Hence, it is not surprising that legislative demands
for information and executive refusals have been so common ;3 what is at first
blush surprising is that the conflict has never come to a real head.
As a matter of constitutional theory the problem might as well arise between
the executive and the judiciary, or the legislative and the judiciary. 4 The latter
problem seems never to have arisen, probably because neither branch has any
information, not available to the public, which is of much interest to the other.
The former has often been raised-in situations in which the government is,
or is said to be, in exclusive possession of relevant evidence-and has given
rise to a considerable body of case law. Most such cases have been decided on
grounds that throw at best a flickering and feeble light on the main question.
Nevertheless, because these cases have been cited as authority,5 and because
it is at least true that there are no better judicial precedents, they merit dis-
cussion.
One class of such cases deals with the situation in which a subordinate
federal official, directed by a court to disclose official information or produce
official records, pleads a departmental regulation forbidding compliance with
material on the subject. Very few politicians (or even ordinary successful people) go
through life without a single discreditable incident and still fewer without making an
enemy.
3. The executive's right to withhold information has been asserted by such Presidents,
in other respects so diverse, as Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Tyler, Buchanan, Grant,
Cleveland, Roosevelt I, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt II, Truman and Eisenhower. These
precedents are recapitulated in Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for
Executive Papers, 10 FED. B.J. 103, 223, 319 (1949).
4. Similarly, an interesting subject for speculation is the possible reaction of a con-
gressional committee to an executive demand for information in the committee's files. In
practice, the traffic has been all the other way, although once or twice the executive has
politely indicated that it would appreciate information as to the facts on which congres-
sional allegations-e.g., some of Senator McCarthy's figures on Communists in govern-
ment-were based.
5. See, e.g., 40 Ops. AT-'Y GEN. 45, 49 (1941). In a memorandum to the President,
released by the White House on May 17, 1954, Attorney General Brownell made the re-
markable and inexact assertion that "Courts have uniformly held that the President and
the heads of departments have an uncontrolled discretion to withhold [from Congress]
the information and papers in the public interest. . . ." N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, p. 24,
col. 2. He cited no cases. The statement, like most of the memorandum, was lifted almost
word for word from a law review article which had appeared some years previously, but
the author of that article cited -no cases either. See Wolkinson, supra note 3. Since there
appears to be no case in which a court has passed on an executive refusal of a congressional
demand for information, the writer must have had in mind cases in which the courts them-
selves have sought to obtain information from the executive-in which case the statement
is still incorrect.
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such a subpoena without the previous consent of the head of the department.6
An act of Congress has long authorized the head of each executive depart-
ment 7 to "prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government
of his Department ... and the custody, use and preservation of the records,
papers and property appertaining to it."'8 It is certainly true that the courts
have consistently treated this statute as validly authorizing the department
head to centralize in himself discretion to grant or withhold information re-
quested by a court; but it is equally true that they have sedulously refrained
from passing on "the ultimate reach of the authority of the [department head]
to refuse to produce at a court's order the government papers in his posses-
sion. .... ,0 Moreover, these decisions plainly furnish no guidance as to the
inherent right of the executive to withhold information from Congress, for
they are based on an act of Congress; what Congress hath given, Congress
can take away. For example: R.S. 161 could scarcely be invoked to justify a
refusal to furnish information to the House and Senate Committees on Govern-
ment Operations, for since 1928 an act of Congress has provided that any de-
partment of the executive shall give them "any information requested of it
relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of said-Gommittee."' 10 In practice,
6. A number of such cases arose because, before the Eighteenth Amendment, federal
law taxed makers and sellers of spirits whose activities might be quite illegal under state
law. On several occasions state courts, in the course of efforts to prosecute moonshiners
and proprietors of blind tigers, attempted to compel the testimony of the federal gaugers,
or the production of Treasury records as to the operations of these criminal taxpayers.
The Treasury, which was naturally reluctant to penalize full disclosure to itself, forbade
its excisemen to reveal information garnered in the course of their official duties. The
validity of its regulation was generally, but not always, upheld until the problem was laid
to rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
E.g., Stegall v. Thurman, 175 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910); In re Lamberton, 124 Fed. 446
(W.D. Ark. 1903). Contra, In re Hirsch, 74 Fed. 928 (D. Conn. 1896).
7. The courts seem to make little distinction between the traditional departments and
the various agencies created by executive order or statute. Cf. Appeal of SEC, 226 F.2
501 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 999
(D.C. Cir. 1951.).
S. REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952).
9. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467 (1951), and, in particular
the concurring opinion of 1%r. Justice Frankfurter at 470, 472. See also Ex parte Sackett, 74
F.2d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1935) and cases cited note 6 supra. Yet a dictum of Learned Hand,
exemplifying the sporadic fallibility of that illustrious judge, cites Boske v. Comingore
and the other cases referred to in note 6 supra for the proposition that it is "lawful for a
department of the government to suppress documents, even when they will help determine
controversies between third persons. . . " See United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503,
506 (2d Cir. 1944).
10. 45 STAT. 996 (1928), 5 U.S.C. § 105a (1952). The statute actually names the
Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Department, the predecessors of the present
Committees on Government Operations. Despite its apparently unambiguous language, its
legislative history can be used to ground a plausible argument that the "information" re-
ferred to was intended to include only noncontroversial types which the executive had
previously furnished to Congress voluntarily. See Wolkinson, supra note 3, at 322-23.
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of course, when the executive is dealing with Congress rather than the courts,
it does not cite R.S. 161 or any other act of Congress. In such circumstances,
the Attorney General invariably asserts a constitutional right, under the prin-
ciple of separation of powers, to grant or withhold in the executive's unfettered
discretion. 1
Another class of cases deals with the "privilege" of the executive to with-
hold from the courts certain not very clearly defined categories of information.
Although there have been too few of these cases to permit the accumulation of
a body of case law clearly drawing the line between privileged and unprivileged
matter, 12 secrets which can readily be classified as "military" or "state" do
not present much difficulty. Thus, in one of the oldest of such decisions, 13 the
administrator of the estate of a deceased spy brought suit to recover salary
due for services in that capacity under a secret contract between the deceased
and President Lincoln. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
petition:
"Public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice,
the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which
the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow
the confidence to be violated. On this principle suits cannot be maintained
which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional,
or those between husband and wife .... Much greater reason exists for
the application of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with
the government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact
not to be disclosed.'
4
The latest opinion of the Supreme Court upholding the privilege, United States
v. Reynolds,15 involved matters equally easy to recognize as military secrets-
official reports dealing with the causes of the crash of an Air Force plane
loaded with experimental electronic equipment. But in the few instances that
have arisen the courts have been at least reluctant to place within the privilege
information which the government desired to keep to itself for reasons other
than military or diplomatic. Thus, courts have shown reluctance to treat as
privileged the statements of witnesses taken by the FBI in the course of a
11. See, e.g., in addition to the Memorandum of Attorney General Brownell, supra
note 5, the opinion of Attorney General Jackson at 40 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 45 (1941), declin-
ing to furnish certain FBI reports to the House Committee on Naval Affairs.
12. A number of these cases are collected and discussed in Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 737
(1956).
13. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
14. Id. at 107. But the facts of the Totten case do not seem to afford a very good
illustration of the principle, for it is hard to see how the disclosure of the existence of the
contract could have harmed the national interest, long after the completion of the contract
and the extinction of the Confederacy. Of course, if the contract had concerned a power
with which the United States had been trying to maintain friendly, or at least diplomatic,
relations, the reasoning of the Court would have been more cogent.
IS. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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routine, nonconfidential investigation,' or the record of the proceedings of a
Naval Board of Inquiry in a similarly commonplace matter.1
7
The majority in the Reynolds case, while explicitly disclaiming any intent
to pass one way or the other on the inherent constitutional power of the ex-
ecutive to withhold information in its sole discretion, nevertheless stated, just
as explicitly, that it is the court, not the executive, which must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege: "Judicial
control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of execu-
tive officers."' 8 The knotty problem of how the judge is to make this deter-
mination without forcing at least a disclosure to himself was dismissed with
no more illuminating answer than a reference to the similar difficulties raised
by claims of privilege under the Fifth Amendment.
The apparent contradiction between the Court's statement that the judge
must determine the nature of the secret and perhaps overrule a claim of privi-
lege, and its disclaimer of intent to pass on the proposition that the head of an
executive department has absolute power to withhold from judicial view docu-
ments in his custody, can perhaps be resolved. Presumably the Court thought
that, even if the documents were found not to be privileged, there would be no
question of actually compelling production of the documents. Instead, the issue
to which the doubtful materials referred would be resolved against the govern-
ment. In the Reynolds case, however, the ground of decision was that since
the Tort Claims Act incorporates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
since those rules penalize only refusal to produce unprivileged documents, the
imposition of even such a penalty for failure to produce privileged documents
would subject the sovereign to liability on terms to which it had not consented.
Deciding the issue to which the suppressed information related against the
government would not, of course, have been exactly the same thing as jailing
the Secretary of the Air Force for contempt, and perhaps the Court refused
to equate prejudice to the government in its conduct of litigation with physical
16. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948), vacated on other
grounds sub nomn. Alltmont v. United States, 174 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1949). The govern-
ment made the somewhat malapropos argument that, since the FBI agents happened to be
members of the bar, their reports were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The case
presented no question of keeping secret the identity of informers. The privilege of with-
holding such information has been recognized in cases too numerous to cite. E.g., Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; United States v. Sun Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 448 (E.D.
Pa. 1950).
17. See Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); cf. Wall-
ing v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
The British courts, while according privilege to military and diplomatic secrets, have
observed by way of dictum that it could not be claimed merely because disclosure "might
involve the Government... in parliamentary discussion or in public criticism ...." -Dun-
can v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 642.
18. 345 U.S. at 9-10. The British Court of Appeals took a similar view in Duncan v.
Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 642.
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compulsion to produce the document. 19 But a distinction-if the Court in-
tended one-between the threat of contempt proceedings and other forms of
pressure is of somewhat dubious validity. It is certain that there have been,
and possible that there may be, cabinet officers whose incarceration would be
much less inimical to the public welfare than mulcting the public fisc of thump-
ing damages for negligence; it is hard to say that the former is compulsion
while the latter is not.
The Court did indeed, in the course of its dissertation upon the scope of the
privilege and the consequences of its invocation, distinguish criminal prosecu-
tion holdings that the government must play a sort of Truth or Consequences
--. e., it must choose between acquittal of the accused and the production of
any relevant material in its possession, even though the government might be
clearly entitled to withhold that material from judicial inspection.20 But it did
so simply on the ground that "such rationale has no application in a civil
forum where the Government is not the moving party, but is a defendant only
on terms to which it has consented." 21 In other words, the bedrock on which
the decision rests is the concept of sovereign immunity. It contains no impli-
cation that there is any other distinction between the application of pressure
by threatening the loss of a civil suit and the application of pressure by
threatening the loss of a criminal action. Assuming that the government is as
interested in enforcing the criminal law as it is in preventing unjustified charges
on the Treasury, one seems about as effective a method of compelling the pro-
duction of information as the other, and both seem to differ in degree rather
than kind from coercion by the threat of contempt proceedings-although the
latter would no doubt have a more abrasive effect on relations between the
executive and the judiciary.22
19. See O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1948), vacated on
other grounds sub norm. Alltmont v. United States, 174 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1949). There
seems to be no case which presents the question of whether a court would attempt to com-
pel actual production of information in the possession of the executive. In all those dis-
cussed in this Article, the government was a party, so that-assuming that it had in fact
no privilege to withhold the information-the ends of justice could adequately be served
by assuming against it the issue on which the requested evidence was alleged to bear.
20. United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Andol-
schek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); cf. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 480
(1941). The Andolschek case, a prosecution against employees of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for seeking bribes, did not in fact involve a claim of privilege based on the nature
of the particular documents requested (which were official reports by the defendants them-
selves on the allegedly criminous transactions) but simply another instance in which regu-
lations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C.
§ 22 (1952) forbade disclosure without his authority.
21. 345 U.S. at 12.
22. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in United States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) "assumes," no doubt correctly, that the Attorney General
could be reached by judicial process if that were necessary to compel him to disclose in-
formation which he is not privileged to withhold. Id. at 472-73. Cf. Land v. Dollar, 190
F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1951), motion for stay denied, 341 U.S. 912 (1951).
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Peering darkly through the glass of these judicial precedents, not always
very clear nor wholly consistent with one another, one can deduce the follow-
ing propositions:
(1) Where the government is the defendant in a civil suit, it may be com-
pelled to choose between losing the suit and producing an unprivileged docu-
ment.
(2) Where the government prosecutes a criminal action, it may be com-
pelled to choose between losing the action and producing any relevant docu-
ment, even one which is privileged. This may be true where the government
is the plaintiff in a civil action.
23
(3) The courts have had no occasion and no inclination to attempt other
methods of compelling the government to produce evidence.
Obviously, none of this is of direct help in determining whether the execu-
tive branch has an inherent constitutional right to withhold information from
the courts, let alone the Congress. Nor is this paucity of authoritative judicial
precedent alleviated by the comparative plethora of ipse dixits on both sides
of the question. Attorneys General have, not surprisingly, invariably supported
the constitutional right of the executive to withhold information from the
Congress.2 4 Congress, as noted above, has by statute declared its right to re-
quire information .2 And a recent study by a committee of Congress came to
the equally predictable conclusion that Congress has constitutional authority to
require the heads of executive agencies to release information upon terms and
conditions prescribed by Congress. 2 6 The same committee, indeed, assembled
a panel of learned professors and eminent counsel, all of whom espoused similar
views-although they did so on grounds of polity and expediency, for, unlike
the Attorneys General, they frankly recognized the absence of authoritative
judicial precedent.
2 7
23. See Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
24. E.g., the Memorandum of Attorney General Brownell, supra note 5; 40 Ops. ATT'y
GEN. 45 (1941) ; 25 Ops. Arry GEN. 326 (1905).
25. 45 STAT. 996 (1928), 5 U.S.C. § 105a (1952). See note 10 mspra. On the other
hand, section 3(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, providing that matters of official
record shall be made available to proper persons "except information held confidential for
good cause found," seems to recognize a right to withhold information. 60 STAT. 238
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (1952). The trouble is, of course, that the act omits to say
who is to find the good cause.
26. See Study by the Staff of the House Committee on Government Operations, The
Right of Congress to Obtain Information from the Executive and from Other Agencies
of the Federal Government, 26 (Committee Print, May 3, 1956) ; Memorandum on Pro-
ceedings Involving Contempt of Congress and its Committees, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary, January 6, 1948) ; Note, 43 GFo.
L.J. 634,647-48 (1955).
27. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Availability of Information from
Federal Departments and Agencies of the House Committee on Governwent Operations,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1956).
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The chances are not particularly good that the courts will soon be called
upon to decide squarely whether the executive can properly resist a congres-
sional demand for information. The question is essentially whether such re-
sistance amounts to a punishable contempt of Congress; and there seem to be
in the last analysis but two ways by which that question can be brought
squarely before the courts. In the first place, such a contempt might be dealt
with by prosecution under the statute which denounces as a misdemeanor re-
fusal to appear or produce papers when required by either house of Congress,28
and the corollary provision which makes it the duty of the appropriate United
States attorney to present to a grand jury instances of such refusal certified
to him by the House or Senate.29 Although the President and the heads of
executive departments have repeatedly, and sometimes brusquely, rejected
such congressional demands, Congress seems never to have reported such a
case to the United States Attorney, nor has the Attorney General ever on his
own motion caused one of them to be prosecuted under this statute. It seems,
somehow, improbable that he ever will-even if the administration should
change immediately after the refusal. Executive esprit de corps appears to be
stronger than loyalty to party shibboleths: the present administration, for
example, has shown itself at least as intransigent as its predecessors in this
respect, to both Republican and Democratic Congresses.30 Even if Congress
should certify such a case to a United States Attorney, it seems intrinsically
likely that the Attorney General would take the position that Congress could
not constitutionally command its prosecution.
Secondly, Congress undoubtedly has power to punish contempts without
invoking the aid of the executive and the judiciary, by the simple and forth-
right process of causing the Sergeant at Arms to seize the offender and clap
him into the common jail of the District of Columbia or the guardroom of the
Capitol Police ;81 and the prisoner can then, of course, try out the propriety of
28. REV. STAT. § 102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952). Prosecutions under
the statute have, of course, multiplied prodigiously since Congressmen discovered the de-
lights of investigations. Although the act goes back to 1857, the Annotation reveals but
two prosecutions under it in its first seventy years. 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 (Supp. 1955).
29. REv. STAT. § 104 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1952).
30. Quite aside from the great McCarthy imbroglio which produced Mr. Brownell's
celebrated memorandum (see note 5 supra), see, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 30, 1955, p. 1, cols.
6-7; March 27, 1956, p. 20, col. 3. Within a year of its accession to power, the present
administration was interposing between Senator McCarthy and the security files of in-
dividual employees the same Truman directives which had been the target of so many
Republican oratorical salvos.
31. Jurney v. McCrackeh, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927) ; see Memorandum on Proceedings Involving Contempt of Congress and its Corn-
nzittees, supra note 26. The District of Columbia jail is no pleasure resort, especially in
summer, and the Capitol guardroom is probably not much more agreeable. Normally, of
course, even in the case of private persons, Congress has preferred the more convenient
and conventional method of referring alleged contempts to the Department of Justice for
prosecution in the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407, 408
(D.D.C. 1952).
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the action by seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Such an episode-assuming
that the information sought by Congress bore some reasonable relation to its
constitutional functions 32 or, in the case of a committee of Congress, to the
scope of the committee's jurisdiction 3 3 -would furnish the courts an admir-
able occasion to decide the precise question of the constitutional authority of
the executive to withhold the desired data. But it is not likely to arise. Con-
gress has never in the past been willing to push matters to the point of dis-
patching the Sergeant at Arms to cleave a path through the Secret Service
cordon and seize the person of the President, or even one of his subordinates. 34
Not even Theodore Roosevelt, at his most pugnacious, could succeed in pro-
voking the Senate into such extreme measures.35 It is more than likely that
Congress never will resort to them.
It is, however, conceivable that the Supreme Court may yet be called upon
to face the closely related and logically indistinguishable question of the exec-
utive's power to reject a judicial subpoena. If, in litigation to which the govern-
ment is not a party, a court becomes convinced that a document in the posses-
sion of the government is relevant, and if it somehow manages to satisfy itself
that that information is unprivileged, and if the determination to withhold is
made by a department head so that there is not presented the situation of a
subordinate taking shelter behind a departmental directive, 36 the courts may
yet have to decide the ultimate reach of the executive's discretion to grant or
withhold information.3 7 But there are plainly too many ifs to make the hypo-
thetical a probability, especially when one considers the acrobatic agility which
the coufts have so far displayed in dodging the question.
The upshot of this judicial abstention is, of course, that the executive enjoys
by pragmatic sanction, if not constitutional law, discretion to decide what in-
32. Cf. Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880). Modern commentators
would give Congress more leeway in the exercise of the investigative power than is sug-
gested by some of the language in the Kilbourne case. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, Ma. JUSTICE
MILLER AND THE SuPRzaE CouRT 332-34 (1939). But the Supreme Court's most recent
word on the subject leaves no doubt that there are constitutional limits-however im-
precise--on Congress' power to inform itself. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
46 (1953).
33. Cf. United States v. Lamont, 236 F2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956).
34. The Daugherty of McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), was not the At-
torney General of fragrant memory, but his brother, Mally S., whose involvement in Harry
l.'s transgressions had been solely in a private capacity.
35. See Burr, THE LETRrs oF Ac=i BUTT 305-06 (1924).
36. See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), and text at note
9 supra.
37. It has been held in a suit between two airlines that a court may compel a Civil
Aeronautics Board inspector to testify to facts observed by him in his official capacity,
either by deposition or in person. The CAB disclaimed, however, any objection to such
testimony; and the court agreed with the Board's contention that "it is error to compel
an agent of the Board to produce any of the Board's reports, orders, or private files or
to testify as to the contents of such private papers." Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951.).
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formation shall be released to Congress. Notwithstanding the battery of au-
thorities assembled by the House Committee on Government Operations,38 the
continuation of this state of affairs does not seem inimical to good government.
In fact, it is the view of the writer that, whereas the present situation is quite
tolerable, unlimited congressional access to executive information (whether
"secrets of state" or merely "official information"3 9) would almost certainly
be intolerable. A number of practical considerations support these propositions:
(1) There is little reason to believe that, in practice, the lack of an absolute
power to compel the executive to produce information appreciably handicaps
Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. It is obvious that in a large
majority of cases it is greatly to the advantage of the executive to cooperate
with Congress, and in a large majority of cases it does so. Congressional con-
trol over appropriations and legislation is an excellent guarantee that the ex-
ecutive will not lightly reject a congressional request for information, for it is
well aware that such a rejection increases the chance of getting either no legis-
lation or undesired legislation.
(2) Congress may not be a safe repository for sensitive information: there
can be no guarantee that information coming into the hands of Congress or
the whole membership of one of its major committees will long remain secret.40
Most Congressmen are, of course, quite as trustworthy as most executive
officials, but there can be no "security program" for legislators. There is no
assurance, if our democracy is to be maintained, that so large a body of men
will not include a percentage, to be expected on statistical grounds, of subver-
sives, alcoholics, psychopaths and other security risks, and no assurance that
the seniority system will not place such a security risk in the chairmanship of
an important committee. Even legislators of high respectability have been
known, in the heat of partisan passion, to place the national interest a very
poor second to considerations of faction.41 If these premises are granted, it
follows that, as a practical matter, Congress ought not to be given an absolute
right of access to military and diplomatic secrets. If such a right existed, it
38. See note 27 supra.
39. One of the experts assembled by the House Committee on Government Operations
proposed that Congress be given unlimited access to information other than "state" (i.e.,
military or diplomatic) secrets, and that an independent "Government Information Com-
mission" be created to pass on executive claims that matter requested by Congress falls
within the category of "state secrets." See Hearings, supra note 27, at 462-65.
40. See, e.g., 94 CONG. Rlc. 5724 (1948). It has been held that the judiciary cannot
restrain Congress from publishing any information in its possession, because to do so
would go counter to the doctrine of separation of powers. Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68,
71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp.
729, 731-32 (D.D.C. 1956). These cases involved the confidential information of private
citizens, but the rationale seems applicable to information obtained from the executive.
41. For example, in 1941 Senator Burton K. Wheeler, an extreme isolationist, re-
vealed the Navy's occupation of Iceland while the operation was still in progress and the
ships involved vulnerable to attack by submarines. See 2 MomisoN & COMMAGER, THE
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIc 669 (3d ed. 1942).
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severely taxes one's faith in legislative moderation to foresee Congress prac-
ticing self-denial to the point of refusing to peek at information on the mere
say-so of a bureaucrat, or even of an independent "Government Information
Commission, '4 2 that such information is a military or diplomatic secret.
(3) There are serious weaknesses in the assumption, popular among liberals
who happen at the moment not to be thinking about Senator McCarthy, that
public policy ought to draw a sharp distinction between "military and diplo-
matic secrets" on the one hand and all other types of official information on
the other, giving Congress free access to the latter.43 In the first place, the line
is by no means easy to draw, even when the best of faith is used: there is not
much information in the files of the State and Defense Departments-of a sort
likely to attract congressional interest-which could not with some plausibility
be given a security classification, if the executive wished to withhold it on that
ground. More fundamentally, however, the executive's interest in the privacy
of certain other types of information is not less than its interest in preserving
its military and diplomatic secrets. One obvious example is the data, derogatory
or otherwise, in the security files of individuals. Another, perhaps still more
important, is the record of deliberations incidental to the making of policy
decisions.44 Undoubtedly the official who makes such a decision should be
answerable to Congress for its wisdom. But the subordinate civil servants who
advise him should be answerable only to him-i.e., they should be able to
present unpalatable facts and make unpopular arguments without fear of being
dragooned by the first Congressman who needs a headline. 45 This principle is
applicable to many government decisions; it finds what is probably its most
compelling illustration in the operation of the employee security system. The
power to discharge an alleged security risk resides in the head of a depart-
ment; his is the decision and his the responsibility to Congress. If the depart-
ment head is conscientious, as is often the case, he personally studies such
42. See note 39 supra.
43. See Hearings, sunpra note 27, at 462-63.
44. The Deputy Attorney General recently stated that the policy of the Department
of Justice "does not permit disclosure of staff memoranda or recommendations." See 58
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 319, 320 (1956).
45. "Because it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of
the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each
other on official matters, and because it is not in the public interest that any of their
conversations or communications or any documents or reproductions concerning such
advice be disclosed, you will instruct employes of your Department that in all of
their appearances before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations regarding the inquiry now before it they are not to testify to any
such conversations or communications or to produce any such documents or repro-
ductions.. ..
Letter from the President to the Secretary of Defense, May 17, 1954. N.Y. Times, May
18, 1954, p. 24, col. 1. The weight of this consideration seems to have become apparent
only in comparatively recent years. So astute a commentator as Wigmore, for example,
completely overlooks it. See WIGMORE, Evn)ENcE § 2378a (3d ed. 1940).
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cases before deciding. But obviously he cannot start from scratch with an un-
digested mass of papers; he must have advice. In the Army, as elsewhere, such
cases are reviewed by screening boards, which make recommendations to the
Secretary. A casus belli in the Army-McCarthy Armageddon was the Army's
repulse of the Senator's attempt to subpoena individual members of these
boards and cross-examine them to find out who had voted to clear employees
whom the Senator termed subversive. 46 It is obvious that if the Senator had
managed to stage this Roman holiday the usefulness of the security review
system would have virtually ended, for it would have taken a man of quite
exceptional hardihood and integrity to exercise his judgment unaffected by the
Senator's hot breath on the nape of his neck. It is one thing for a cabinet officer
to defend a decision which, however just, offends the prejudices of a powerful
Congressman and, very probably, a highly vocal section of the public; it is
quite another thing for a middle aged, middle-ranking civil servant, who needs
his job, to do so. The Secretary's own responsibility to Congress for wrong
decisions is a sufficient guarantee that he will not long tolerate incompetent or
disloyal advisors; and he is certainly in a much better position to detect such
undesirables than is any member, or even any committee, of Congress.
The other side of the case was eloquently stated by Professor Bernard
Schwartz, testifying before the Subcommittee on Government Information of
the House Committee on Government Operations. He said:
"[Tihe overriding danger is not congressional abuse but the vesting of
unfettered discretion in the executive to surround with secrecy all its
activities.
"Those who are concerned with the possibility of legislative abuse
ignore the overriding peril of the present century, that of the superstate
with its omnipotent administration, unrestrained by any checks on its all
pervasive regulatory activities, so vividly pictured by George Orwell in
his novel 1984. The great danger today is 1984, not Senator McCarthy.
If the elected representatives of the people assert their right to lay bare
all that goes on within the executive, that danger may be avoided. An
executive whose abuses and inadequacies are exposed to the public eye
can hardly become a menace to constitutional government.' '47 -
The plain and short answer to this is that neither can there be a menace to
constitutional government by an executive which has to go to Congress for
every cent it spends, which has no power by itself to raise and maintain armed
forces and which cannot jail its citizens except under a law passed by Congress
and after proceedings presided over by an. independent judiciary. These are
the factors that make the essential difference between an American President
and Big Brother-not whether Senator McCarthy is or is not allowed to pros-
pect in the security files of charwomen, junior clerk-typists and building
46. The Army based its refusal on directives of President Truman which, not having
been revoked by the new administration, were still in force, notably his directive of March
13, 1948. 13 FED. REG. 1359 (1948).
47. Hearings, supra note 27, at 465.
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guards. Moreover, on the pragmatic basis of the experience of the last decade
or so, the proposition that Congress is the paladin of civil liberties and the
executive their foe seems at least debatable.
In practice, of course, as has already been suggested, the executive has not
"unfettered discretion . ..to surround with secrecy all its activities." 48 All
but a minute percentage of congressional requests for information are honored
promptly and even with a show of cheerfulness, for the very good reason that
the executive needs from Congress cooperation which it will not get without
reciprocating.
A brief consideration of the generally satisfactory modus vivendi which has
evolved may help to dispel the picture of the executive branch in the character
of Domitian. There is, of course, no statute that sets standards for the release
of information to Congress, and only sporadically, as in the case of security
files, are there formal executive regulations. Usually, the head of a department
has an aide-often his general counsel-who is responsible for what is bureau-
cratically known as "legislative liaison." The aide controls the flow of infor-
* mation to Congress, referring only the hottest questions to his boss. Of course
the abilities and views of these virtuosi vary widely, and most of them play by
ear, but, according to the writer's observation, the most experienced of them
agree on certain fundamental policies. These policies may be briefly sum-
marized, as follows:
(1) No fishing expeditions are allowed. The initiators of a congressional
investigation (who, in practice, are often members of committee staffs rather
than the Congressmen themselves) must define with reasonable precision the
general area which they intend to investigate and the character of the docu-
ments they wish to see.
(2) No "raw" files are to be released. The files requested will be screened
by the legislative liaison officer or one of his assistants, who will remove any
documents which, in his judgment (or, as in the case of individual security
files, because of directives of higher authority) should not go outside the ex-
ecutive branch. There can be no blinking the fact that this affords an oppor-
tunity for serious abuse. It is entirely justifiable and sometimes necessary to
remove, for example, genuine military or diplomatic secrets, or documents
identifying confidential informants, or confidential data respecting costs or
production techniques furnished by private business. 49 It is arguably justifi-
able, for the reasons outlined above, to remove recommendations on policy
made by subordinate officials, or documents (besides the above-mentioned in-
dividual security data) containing allegations which, although unsubstantiated,
48. Ibid.
49. Compare the recent action of the Department of Justice in refusing to give the
House Committee on the Judiciary access to the files relating to settlement of the anti-
trust suit against American Telephone and Telegraph Company. The Deputy Attorney
General said that such action "would violate the confidential nature of settlement nego-
tiations" and "discourage defendants, present and future, from entering into such nego-
tiations." See 58 Put. Uni.. FoiR. 319, 320 (1956).
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might work irreparable injury to private reputations. But it is most certainly
unjustifiable to remove part of a file simply because it betrays administrative
stupidity or inertia. The temptation to indulge in just such an abuse is, of
course, considerable. The only answers to this objection are first, that the risk
of abuse and consequent prejudice to efficient government which it raises is
on the whole less than the risk inherent in giving Congress free access to
executive files; and second, that in practice, competent department heads
sooner or later learn the truth of the homely maxim about honesty as a policy
in their dealings with Congress. It pays better to admit errors and correct them
than to deny their existence; Congress, when it embarks on an investigation
of an executive abuse, usually has other sources of information-e.g., dis-
gruntled contractors or bidders-than the files of the executive, and these other
sources, if untempered by complete disclosure, are likely to make matters look
much worse than they really are.
(3) Congressional recipients of classified information must themselves be
subjected to a security check. Committees of Congressmen and their aides are,
of course, constantly given access to military and diplomatic secrets. The De-
partment of Defense applies to members of committee staffs the same criteria
which it applies to its own employees and grants them appropriate clearances,
the committee chairman being always formally reminded of the statutes and
regulations applicable to any such information transmitted. Congressmen them-
selves are a more delicate problem. The executive is naturally reluctant to say
outright that a member of a coordinate branch of government is not regarded
as a proper person to be trusted with his country's secrets-although it has
done so on occasion. Seniority may bring a security risk to the chair of an
important committee or subcommittee. Fortunately, this has never happened;
if and when it does, great finesse will be required to solve the resulting prob-
lems of committee access to executive information.
(4) The executive should have a chance to comment on any resulting com-
mittee report before it is published. The more responsible committee chairmen
usually agree to some such arrangement, the utility of which is obvious. Bona
fide mistakes can be eliminated in this way, and both sides of a disputed ques-
tion brought out. A committee is, of course, under no obligation to submit its
drafts to such a preview or, if it does so, to accept any of the executive's com-
ments and suggestions. Some chairmen are unwilling to permit their reports
to be inspected before they are made public-perhaps because they feel it
wasteful to dull a sparkling, sensational allegation by exposing it to lackluster
facts.
These principles are, of course, primarily designed for dealing with respon-
sible committees, who are trying to fulfill a legislative function beyond the mere
capture of headlines. Rules for dealing with the guerillas, the Congressional
Comanches, are naturally far harder to formulate. Still, there are one or two
basic, simple principles which, based on the experience of the present writer,
50. Representative Robert L. Condon of California was barred from a test of nuclear
weapons in May, 1953. See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1953, p. 12, col. 1.
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the executive ought as a general thing to employ in dealing with the irrespon-
sibles. For example, the brunt of denying a demand for information, which
cannot be acceded to, should be borne at the highest level-by the department
head and even, if the matter is important enough, by the President.5 1 It is un-
fair and unwise to expect a subordinate official to weather the congressional
blast alone. Thus, if it can be predicted-as it frequently can be-that Senator
So-and-So is going to demand from an official witness information which
should not be disclosed, the witness should carry up to the Hill in his pocket
a letter from the department head, describing in some detail the prohibited
categories of information and instructing him to refer demands for such data-
courteously-to the signer of the letter. If trouble is anticipated, the witness
ought, moreover, to be accompanied by counsel. It takes a lawyer, and a fairly
astute and cool-headed one at that, to deal with such maneuvers as vociferous
insistence that a witness, barred from saying what he has done or will do in
his official capacity in an actual case, give his "personal opinion" as to what
ought to be done in a hypothetical case closely resembling the actual one. An-
other sound principle is to produce promptly, and publicize as widely as pos-
sible, all the germane facts (such as the context from which misleading ex-
cerpts have been torn) which can be released, together with an explanation of
the reasons-which had better be good-for withholding the others. The ruses
de guerre of the legislative franc-tireurs are, naturally, extremely varied, and
certainly the author of this paper would not and could not attempt to catalogue
them all; but it seems to be true, if banal, that the impact of most of them is
minimized by maximum candor and disclosure on the part of the executive
branch.
CONCLUSION
A situation so ambiguous and muddled cannot fail to distress the tidy-
minded constitutionalist. And yet there is every prospect that it will continue
for some time to come. For reasons given it is not likely soon to be cleared up
by judicial decision. An act of Congress, even if it avoided or surmounted a
presidential veto, would simply beg the question.52 An amendment to the
Constitution would at least meet the problem squarely; in view of the recent
vogue of amendments designed to limit the powers of the executive, it is per-
haps a matter of some surprise that none such has been seriously proposed.
Perhaps this is so because, on the whole, a good case can be made out for the
proposition that the present imprecise situation is, in fact, reasonably satis-
factory. Neither the executive nor the Congress is very sure of its rights, and
both usually evince a tactful disposition not to push the assertion of their rights
to abusive extremes. Of such is the system of checks and balances.
51. E.g., the Truman directive cited in note 46 supra, and the Eisenhower directive
cited in note 45 .mpra.
52. In 1948 the House passed a Joint Resolution in substance purporting to require
the executive to furnish to all House and Senate committees any information the commit-
tees might deem necessary. H.R.J. REs. 342, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; see 94 CONG.
REc. 5821 (1948). The Resolution died in the Senate.
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